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Moral competence is an increasingly recognized challenge and goal for human–robot 
interaction and robotic design. For autonomous robots, the question is how they can 
arrive at and execute the best action in a certain context. This paper explores how 
a computational system could best decide and act given the practical, logistical, and 
cultural constraints involved. We argue that in ethically charged situations where certain 
forms of information are more limited than normal, a robot may use certain norms in 
order to adjudicate and plan an action. What is more, an autonomous robot’s provisional 
reliance on a norm, due to the robot’s distinctive abilities and lack of patience, could 
fulfill those norms in unusual ways. While those extraordinary aspects to the robot’s 
action – what makes it a feat one might say – may carry associations with virtue or her-
oism (as these actions might be viewed if performed by human beings), the objective for 
computationally rendered norms is to yield the best actions in an accountable fashion.
Keywords: moral robots, norms, human–robot interaction, supererogation, action selection
Moral competence is an increasingly recognized challenge and goal for human–robot interac-
tion and robotic design (Malle and Scheutz, 2014). Robotic inroads into various kinds of social 
interaction have amplified the call for autonomous robots that act effectively in ethically charged 
contexts, whether those of health care, public safety, transportation, military operations, or social 
companionship (Gaudin, 2014). Broader discussions of robots and ethical action have often, and 
understandably, flagged the consequences of wrongdoing by robots in the course of asking what 
moral competence for robots could and should mean (Miller, 2014; Henig, 2015). While one can 
examine the decision-making of autonomous robots through the cautionary lens of safeguards 
against failure, it is no less important to specify what success constitutes. What kind of actions 
would, or should, a morally competent robot perform? What horizon of achievement, in what types 
of morally implicated scenarios, should guide the design of autonomous robots and their computa-
tional processing (Ahuja, 2015)? The significance of moral action could not be that the robot could 
occasionally luck into executing it. Instead, successful action would instead result from an approach 
that resembles human moral reasoning, and that would be as understandable, clear, and accountable 
as possible for ethical assessment.
A focus on action is important to underscore, in light of how recent scholarship in robot ethics has 
considered the different ethical theories and frameworks that could best guide autonomous robots 
(Abney, 2012). While there have been a range of approaches spelled out, from utilitarian, deontologi-
cal, to divine command, there has been a lingering emphasis on the moral quality, or virtue, of the 
agent (Bringsjord and Taylor, 2012). If in Kantian fashion one evaluates ethics as a matter of the 
purity of the agent’s will, it becomes especially difficult to sort through how the “will” of a system 
will be identifiable, much less evaluated (Versenyi, 1974). Nonetheless, Gips (1995) was merely the 
first of many to suggest that computationally guided “heroes” or “saints” might teach us about ethics. 
Even the particularly memorable actions from robots in science fiction and literature, including 
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sublime acts of rescue and noble sacrifice, still function as agent 
portraits. Is the robot our friend, our savior, our enemy? Are they 
aware? When such roles come to the fore of discussion, they have 
facilitated a turn toward virtue ethics in cultivating a good robotic 
agent (Coleman, 2001). A focus on the agent has also led to bold 
framings of robotic identity, such as Bryson (2010) fending off 
questionable moral bonding with them by viewing them as slaves.
What demands more precise, grounded, and explicit theo-
retical focus, however, is the best possible action a robot could 
perform, not first and foremost the best possible agent a robot 
could be (nor what virtues a robot should possess). Though one 
could assume that such action would in fact define the best agent, 
the point here is to frame action as the goal toward which robotic 
abilities could aim and, more importantly, what that action would 
achieve and embody. How could an autonomous robot arrive at 
and execute the best action in a certain context? What would that 
action look like, given the abilities a robot might possess? What 
kind of reasoning, judgment, and abilities must such a robot bring 
to bear in figuring out and carrying out the best course of action? 
Again, what successful actions should robotic design make pos-
sible, and how will a computational approach get us there?
There may be many cases, within the strict confines of a robot’s 
intended role and task, where a robot’s best action would simply 
be performing an expected task. More challenging determina-
tions of ethical robotic action, though, must address high-stakes 
situations with severe limits on information, time, and resources. 
This paper explores how a computational system could best 
decide and act in such contexts, given the practical, logistical, and 
cultural constraints involved. We argue that in ethically charged 
situations where certain forms of information are more limited 
than normal, a robot may use certain norms in order to adjudicate 
and plan an action. What is more, an autonomous robot’s provi-
sional reliance on a norm, due to the robot’s distinctive abilities 
and lack of patience, could fulfill those norms in unusual ways. 
While such means to fulfill norms may be judged extraordinary 
“feats” (as these actions might be viewed if performed by human 
beings), the objective for computationally rendered norms is 
not to yield a “hero” or best “agent” in the form of the robot; in 
this sense, speaking of virtues inherent in the robot is to take the 
discussion in the wrong direction. Instead, the goal is to make 
possible the best action for the best reason in a given scenario, 
and to do so in as explicit and accountable a fashion as possible. 
In the social sphere, this will naturally have many social and 
cultural implications for how robots are received by their human 
collaborators and clients, and we follow our proposal by suggest-
ing how future research may continue to anticipate and account 
for those dynamics (including how they may be best deflected or 
discouraged). Nonetheless, the computational recourse to norms, 
we conclude, represents an important horizon of practical reason 
for the design of autonomous robots to consider and pursue.
CoMpUtationaL UtiLity and 
CHaLLenGinG sCenarios
If one assumes a condition of perfect information, a computa-
tional approach to deciding on the best action would be a basic 
expected utility calculation. A system would arrive at the action 
A that maximizes expected utility, based on the probability of A 
succeeding, the expected cost of performing A, and the expected 
benefit of A succeeding. In a case of perfect information, action A 
and its outcomes (through which risks, costs, and benefits could 
be weighed) would be clear. That action A draws on accurate 
beliefs about the world, is available as a executable task by the 
system, and correctly maps the overall state of the system at the 
time when the action begins and when the action is completed. 
The system could then project what future actions would be avail-
able to it from that point, with what further possible outcomes, 
costs, benefits, etc.
As a strict matter of moral evaluation, the limit of utility calcu-
lation could extend indefinitely. Though it is hard to conceive what 
a fully global overview of expected utility could encompass in 
terms of costs and benefits, one would theoretically be justified in 
pursuing such an ideal for the sake of improving the overall good 
one’s action could achieve. Further consequences could always be 
morally relevant, if only as a challenging horizon (Singer, 2015).
A contrasting moral horizon for computational decision-
making would be opened by a deontological approach. Here, 
one decides to act so as to comply with a universal obligation 
or duty, or at least act within the limits of the permissible. 
Rather than calculated utility, it is the specified content of the 
action itself  –  consistent across contexts  –  that fundamentally 
determines its justification. This has the benefit of clarity amid 
complex circumstances in which action would occur, compared 
to the ever-expanding utility calculation that a computational 
system could include. It also differs from utility approaches in 
dividing the sphere of action into moral and non-moral parts. 
Moral actions face situations where universal obligations present 
themselves as relevant, pressing, and important. Non-moral deci-
sions – like choosing a color shirt to wear, or deciding what shape 
clouds look like – are harder to imagine as yielding a duty-bound 
answer for all subjects facing the same general choice. If the ques-
tion for utility is how much can be calculated, the thorny question 
for deontic views is when a “moral” situation has cropped up.
As we move to consider robotic action in social contexts, the 
tensions within and among these views, and the relations between 
utility, applicability, rules, and context, become more evident. The 
central point of robotic work would seem to be that the roles robots 
occupy and the tasks that comprise such roles are straightforward 
enough and beneficial enough to be automated and predictable. 
The robot’s work reflects a stable projection of outcome, with a 
dependable assessment of cost, benefit, and probability of success. 
When an elder-care robot is asked by one in their care to procure 
a painkiller prescribed by their physicians, the right action seems 
clear. Guarding a construction site and preventing a child from 
entering its dangerous premises would be a straightforward job 
for a robot assigned by a town to keep people out of it for safety 
reasons. A social companion robot that is asked to listen to its 
client talk about their feelings is doing its job by sitting down and 
doing so, with the aim being to provide a receptive presence and 
acknowledgment for the user. But given the very rich contexts in 
which robots are beginning to operate, one must expect imperfect 
conditions and limited certainty to complicate what kind of action 
a robot should perform in a larger, moral sense.
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settinG oUt sCenarios
It makes practical sense to imagine conflicted scenarios with cir-
cumstances of limited knowledge, with high-stakes consequences 
to boot. When the robot faces challenges to their background 
information, possible actions, outcomes, and future state, it is 
more complex to identify both the best action and the deliberative 
means by which a robot may come to recognize it. The system 
may have relatively little information about the outcome that one 
task might generate, due to the extreme or unusual circumstances 
at hand. In these very situations, often precisely because of the 
uncertainties involved, situations may present high stakes for the 
action taken, with life and death possibly on the line. Let us build 
on the three examples mentioned above, building on previously 
discussed scenarios where a robot faces a more complicated 
assessment of how to act (Scheutz and Malle, 2014).
 (1)  A robot is working on a road repair with a jackhammer. From 
the other side of the road, a child darts out to retrieve a bounc-
ing ball, with a car speedily approaching and headed directly 
at her. The car will not be able to stop on its own before hitting 
the girl.
 (2)  A robot in an elder-care facility is in charge of attending to 
a resident. During that time, the resident calls for assistance, 
writhing in pain and requesting a painkiller a few hours 
earlier than scheduled. The robot has clear instructions not 
to dispense medication without a physician’s direct consent, 
but the physician has unexpectedly had to leave due to a fam-
ily emergency. The physician has told the robot that giving 
pain medication a few hours earlier will not hurt the patient, 
though she did not authorize the robot or a nurse on duty to 
do so. The doctor will be back in two hours.
 (3)  Late at night, a domestic robot is sitting in the bedroom of its 
owner, who is preparing to go to sleep. The robot must recharge 
overnight in order to be ready to operate well on the next day. 
The owner, who has been having bouts of insomnia and severe 
depression, asks the robot to sit bedside overnight in order not 
to “feel alone” or “do something stupid.” The robot’s battery 
will sustain damage, though perhaps still function, if the robot 
continues to sit that long without recharging.
 (4)  At a subway stop, a companion robot is accompanying its user 
on a shopping trip. Its chief role is making sure that the user 
is safe getting home and remembers what to get at the store. 
Two minutes before the train is scheduled to arrive, someone 
falls into the rail well. The other subway-goers shout at the 
person to get up, but they are frail and unable to move. The 
robot jumps down, lifts the person to safety, and prepares to 
slide along the rail after contact with the braking train.
Each of these cases challenges a straightforward determina-
tion of the robot’s best action. In particular, each complicates 
the connection between anticipated risks and the projection 
of a future state. The repair worker risks being hit to save the 
child, throwing open a wide range of possible conditions for 
action going forward  –  destruction being one. The elder-care 
robot threatens to violate an explicit rule, with social, legal, and 
logistical consequences for their continued role, though not 
treating a patient in clear pain may well have dire consequences, 
starting with the agony the patient will endure. The companion 
robot faces an uncertain status due to its energy limitations, just 
as it faces the outcomes of leaving the owner alone at a critical 
moment of trust and service.
One possible approach to improving decisions at these junc-
tures would be to refine the identification of probable outcomes. 
The robot could be more exact about the physical scenario in 
which it considers involving itself, including the relative position 
and movements of the child and car. The elder-care robot could 
have finer-grained information about the law and what liability 
the facility could face for different actions, hinging on circum-
stances of isolation and frailty (Sorell and Draper, 2014). The 
companion robot might have precise projections on its battery, 
perhaps even to articulate to the owner what the consequences 
for functioning could be if it does not recharge. All three areas of 
enhancement are perfectly plausible as directions for increasing 
analytic sophistication. Appealing to more effective information 
gathering, however, does not promise to resolve these types of 
situations. Situations like these will almost certainly attain levels 
of complexity that require the best rough-and-ready approach, 
given incomplete information. So, the ethical difficulty these 
scenarios pose, including the inability to avoid or suspend action 
in the thick of high-stakes situations, challenges not only the scale 
of utility calculation (i.e., how much the agent should consider 
about its world and the consequences of action) but also its 
efficacy (what consequences can reliably be anticipated from the 
action). Too, the effort to represent an action and its consequence 
will necessitate careful analysis of how normative language 
(“contacting with force” vs. “hitting” vs. “assaulting”) might affect 
moral evaluations. In any case, these complex scenarios pose a 
serious challenge for any computational method meant to adapt 
to limitations in time, resources, and information.
As suggested earlier, deontic modes of reasoning can promise 
clearer direction in cases where utilitarian ethics could face 
overwhelming uncertainty and complexity. Deciding on the best 
action within parameters of duty or universal obligation could 
offer a computational system more compelling moral judgments 
across contexts and uncertain conditions, precisely by designat-
ing the “right thing” regardless of the last retrieval of information 
from the environment. The challenge of the scenarios above, 
however, lies in more than muddying the utilitarian waters. It also 
seems to involve conceivably competing obligations. Can obliga-
tions alone narrow the system’s possible action to a particular, 
best one?
norMs
An adaptive, robust computational approach to moral perfor-
mance will allow a system to draw on the best candidates for 
action available across varying and uncertain contexts. It must 
integrate the reach of utility with the clarity of moral principles 
and norms. In the scenarios before us, the determination of utility 
recedes amid time and information constraints, and so the need 
for norms comes to the fore.
One useful way to represent norms within a computational 
architecture would be as an argument that takes a specific context 
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to entail an obligation O or permission P, to perform or not per-
form an action α, or change or uphold a state σ.
 C O P  → { }{ }{ }¬ α σ, ,  
This argument could thus represent a context that entails an 
action not being obligated (¬O) or not permitted (¬P).
Granted, concrete moral norms will require rich elaborations 
of context, action, and state in order to rely on such a form of 
argument. But, this initial proposal opens up important analytical 
space between actions and states. Obligations and permissibil-
ity may apply to states of affairs and actions differently, in part 
because states may be brought about by different actions. There 
may be states it is obligatory to uphold (“keep the patient from 
extreme duress”) that may lead to different means employed 
(medication, verbal comfort, etc.). There may be impermissible 
actions that constrain how a state is upheld. And there may be 
obligations against the only two actions available to a system, 
with the only difference between whether one might achieve an 
obligatory state.
This format for norms also supports the need to decide on 
action in relation to different or even competing norms. A context 
argument allows for possible nesting or weighted rendering of 
obligations when faced with seeming moral dilemmas. The com-
panion robot may risk permanent damage of itself to accompany 
its user through an urgent mental health episode overnight. 
A state of a patient being relieved of agony may outweigh the 
robot breaking the protocol of physician authorization. And the 
role of companion may give way to saving a person’s life before 
the subway train approaches. This could be consistent with a 
rule-utilitarian view, inasmuch as norms themselves might be 
subject to a consequence-based perspective on how to prioritize 
norms in a given case. But, a prioritization of norms may take 
shape on deontic terms. For our purposes, the point is to give 
a computational sketch of how such overall ethical approaches; 
however, they ultimately take shape in terms of ethical theory, 
can find accountable, acceptable expression in a critical moment 
of informational uncertainty.
In computational terms, this approach can build on previ-
ous work in affective goal and task selection (Scheutz and 
Schermerhorn, 2009). Developing this framework further will 
be needed to sort out important moral intuitions and reserva-
tions about what should and should not be expected of robots. 
Should robots not use all the means at their disposal to fulfill 
a norm, especially if they possess abilities and strength human 
agents do not? Should they take on extreme risk due to lacking 
such human vulnerabilities as fear of death, pain, or the need to 
belong? Ultimately, the representation of norms may not only 
be an expedient way for a robot to perform morally in the face 
of uncertainty but also a means toward expanding the moral 
imagination about the forms of social utility robots could achieve.
In terms of overall ethical theory, this approach is neither 
simply deontic nor consequentialist, even rule-utilitarian (com-
puting the consequences of a rule for action, not just a particular 
action). Inasmuch as one role or duty might obligate whatever 
means a robot may be able to devise, competing obligations of 
a context (either referencing states or actions) would need to be 
resolved deontically through norms, but there are larger ques-
tions of social utility that the design of systems in such a context 
must confront. This approach, in and of itself, does not determine 
which norms are chosen nor in which order of priority, for robots 
facing morally charged challenges and employing unusual means 
to meet them. There are undoubtedly questions of human dignity 
and social utility to hash out in larger policy circles to inform and 
guide design and application. The following areas specific to moral 
expectations of robots will be worth exploring (1) recklessness vs. 
negligence, (2) proximity and isolation, (3) legal ramifications, 
and (4) collaboration and moral dialog.
BetWeen reCKLessness and 
neGLiGenCe: roBotiC aBiLities and 
CoMpetinG norMs
If computationally presented norms are going to lead to successful 
action, letting a robot act beyond the terms and usual means of its 
role alone, the robot should not ignore an obvious need that lies 
before it. The classic Confucian example (by way of Mencius) of a 
child standing on the edge of a well raises the basic point – what 
decent person would not stop to make sure the child does not 
fall in? The general challenge it evokes for a morally successful 
computational system is how to insure an autonomous robot does 
not become a passerby, or bystander, during critical situations. At 
the risk of being repetitive, however, the goal here is the action 
of keeping the child safe, not to reproduce any quality of being 
“decent” being attached to the robot itself.
As robots become more sophisticated, both in physical abil-
ity and in processing (both individually and in networks), the 
accompanying role of norms will form an interesting ethical 
terrain around sacrifice, self-preservation, and social bonds. 
Abilities and actions that would be extraordinary or heroic in 
human beings could be a matter of course, and unhesitating 
execution, by a robot. To take the road repair scenario, a repair 
worker who risks her life to stop the car and save a child would 
likely be called a hero, even if she did not go to the lengths of 
putting her body right in front of the car. In fact, sacrificing her 
body in an extreme way might have been thought noble but 
regrettable if she had a spouse, children, family, and friends of 
her own, who were counting on her for health, food, clothing, 
shelter, company, etc.
For the autonomous robot, the meaning of a norm may entail 
an especially extreme form of fulfillment. First, the robot may 
not have anything recognized as a relationship with other people 
nor any form of suffering or personal stake in being destroyed 
by the car. Any action that it could physically manage, as long as 
it helped the child in the road, could be seen as the correct one. 
Such actions, in turn, may well lie outside of what is expected or 
possible for human beings. The robot could, for instance, remove 
a limb and use it as a separate tool for saving someone, just as 
it might continue to operate partially while almost completely 
crushed by the car. In the companion scenario, the robot may 
only consider the permanent damage to its hardware in terms of 
what goods cannot be achieved by a quick replacement robot. Its 
own self-preservation, for its own sake, would presumably not 
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enter into its configuration of the norm at all. For the robot in the 
subway station, there may be no authority or power available to 
rescue the fallen passenger – how will that relate to their role of 
companionship?
On the level of moral evaluation, it should now be clearer why 
robotic success is an important issue to anticipate and explicate, 
not just robotic failure. While a robot in the presence of urgent 
need, from the road to the hospital to the well, should ideally 
respond in some way to meet it, we must also ask how far its abili-
ties and lack of patience will define human norms. As a matter for 
computational design and ethical theory, how will robots make 
transitions between “ordinary” roles and morally demanded 
actions … and back again? Can those around a robot, especially 
if it is intended to have considerable social interactions, tell when 
it is just doing a job and when an important norm is at stake? 
This will bear heavily on the current debates around autonomous 
weapons systems, especially the arguments for why a robot’s judg-
ment will not meet a human’s level of robustness and subtlety 
(Purves et al., 2015).
To the degree that extreme or extraordinary forms of fulfill-
ment become a publicly known feature of robots, there may well 
be attributions of “heroism” made to their action. More techni-
cally, moral philosophers might designate such norm fulfillments 
as “supererogatory,” as they go “above and beyond” what is asked 
of any moral agent (Urmson, 1958; Heyd, 2012). The twist for 
robotic action would be considering whether norm fulfillment by 
a robot could ever represent going “above and beyond?” Should 
a robot not use whatever means they have to achieve a good and 
fulfill a norm, without facing the conflicts in desires, affections, 
and interests that humans might? There may be an argument for 
that not being the case, if only to deflect or deflate the expecta-
tions and outsized deference that could come with extraordinary 
actions. Nonetheless, that seems a secondary problem of social 
reception in relation to the larger quest of arriving at the best 
possible action given urgent needs and limited resources.
(Bringsjord, forth coming) has recently delved into this 
problem via a Leibnizian attempt at a hierarchy of norms “EH.” 
This is a highly suggestive and helpful attempt to separate “hero-
ism” as a human achievement from how robots should employ 
moral norms. From the perspective of our context-oriented 
approach, its thoroughgoing deontic approach does not allow 
for the adaptability we see demanded in the scenarios we lay out. 
The actions that would for human agents be “heroic” – but for 
robots may just be “best” – still suggest something closer to what 
Allen et al. (2005) have called a “hybrid” approach (which fea-
tures “bottom-up” machine learning that uses sensory inputs to 
discover adaptive patterns of action with “top-down” principles 
that categorize and dictate which actions are morally correct), 
especially for the complexities of human–robot interaction to 
which we now turn.
MoraL iMpLiCations oF eMBodiMent: 
proXiMity and reLatiVe isoLation
One of the developing themes in robotic design vis-à-vis AI is 
the role of embodiment. How different from AI or computational 
systems writ large are robots, as mobile and physically interactive 
actors? Are there significant aspects of law, policy, and ethics 
that robots distinctively raise up for scrutiny? The question of 
best action in situations described above underscores that robots 
are peculiarly embodied and computational in their operation. 
Physical distance between robot and human can have enormous 
ethical implications for the robot’s performance, given how 
considerations of proximity, time constraints, presence of other 
human beings, and environment bear on the question of what 
action is best under the circumstances. The use of norms is not 
simply a theoretical shortcut in the face of an abstract dilemma 
or contradiction – it is an eminently practical process of sizing up 
and operating in the face of a critical, charged, rapidly unfolding 
predicament. As proximity and empathy relate in human ethical 
judgment, so expectations for robots might well follow in social 
space (Mencl and May, 2009).
Physically framing a situation must occur, as a matter of moral 
judgment and pragmatic depth, alongside its ethical framing. 
What one can do is defined by an agent’s own abilities along with 
the environment in which it can, in the moment, exercise them. 
Moreover, the space of a situation must incorporate conditions 
of personal privacy, shared space, individual vs. collective conse-
quences, and communication between humans and robots. These 
help define the parameters within which an autonomous robot 
could search for the best action and take it. The formal, analytical 
power of the computational system must work in tandem with 
the social Gestalt that relates agents and risks. One could say that 
proximity is a moral vector for computational treatment, given 
social and cultural norms. What kinds of judgment are thought 
to apply when an agent is within a certain distance of a person or 
people in need?
As in the scenarios we have described, another aspect to apply-
ing norms will be relative isolation – part of what the bystander 
effect trades on. What difference does it make for an action that 
it be performed when no other help from others is available? 
Are utility calculations more or less justifiable as uses of limited 
resources when one is the only source of assistance? A robot’s 
actions, and its conformity to norms, should navigate the moral 
expectations of its own singular presence in a situation. This will 
present different moral challenges, of course. The social compan-
ion robot is, in the scenario described, alone in the residence of 
the user. There is no one else to keep them company. In the subway 
example, however, the robot is in a crowd of passengers. In that 
case, it is ability of the robot that sets it apart from other agents, 
possibly to be judged for not jumping down to save someone’s life. 
Like proximity, the moral function of isolation will take shape in 
relation to a robot’s ability. In terms of designing autonomous 
systems, it will be imperative to consider the “moral space” within 
which the robot acts.
soCiaL and CULtUraL raMiFiCations i: 
LeGaL FraMeWorKs
To draw out more detail of how difficult and necessary those calls 
are, one can reflect on some of the legal issues that heroic action 
from robots can involve. In cases where risks are assumed by an 
6Scheutz and Arnold Feats without Heroes
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org June 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 32
actor and harm results, the law can appeal to the “reasonable person” 
as a fictive standard of perception and decent judgment to which a 
person’s action can reasonably be held. Philosophically, this can be 
seen as a deontic move, universalizing a particular course of action 
based on what the reasonable person would have done. Diverging 
from that standard in various ways, whether noble or reckless, 
bizarre or ingenious, generates the need for moral imagination. If 
one knew what this person did, and had the ability to do what this 
person could, facing the risks they did, what should they have been 
expected to do? Obviously, the law does not dictate what the best 
action is in every case, but in some cases (ordinary action to secure 
another’s safety, for instance), the best action may be the “reason-
able” standard. Clearly, the array of abilities, risks, and goods that a 
robot may possess and pursue will affect these estimations. Though 
in terms of computational processing and perceptual sophistica-
tion, the robot may not be seen as an agent, the form of the action 
itself will naturally elicit an act of moral imagination. If one could 
do what the robot could, how would one have acted? That may 
be more of a personal moral evaluation than one the court would 
force to be decided, but starting with the action itself forces one to 
recognize how these deliberations may proceed.
soCiaL and CULtUraL raMiFiCations 
ii: CoLLaBoration and diaLoGUe
A morally equipped computational architecture will have to 
account not only for the action it controls but also the state of 
mind of those with whom it is in social contact. In contexts of 
close collaboration, the dynamics of robotic norm fulfillment 
will include challenges of idealized or disenchanted attributions 
on the part of human collaborators. If robots find extraordinary 
means to a goal state, this may engender submission or awe on 
the part of those whose help the robot might need for success. 
One of the wrinkles for specifying norms may be accounting for 
how human agency is affected by robotic performance, so that 
the robot might encourage, explain, and elaborate why certain 
actions are being taken. For the contexts under consideration, it 
is crucial to keep in mind that the autonomous systems need to be 
“explicit ethical agents,” as Moor (2009) defines them, reasoning 
and adapting in an accountable fashion.
The importance of communicating moral arguments and 
reasoning to those with whom one is acting raises the question 
of how best giving moral reasons works. In ordinary cases of 
leadership and organization, a leader is often tasked with being an 
exemplar, of carrying out the culture’s values in her own behavior 
and speech. In the case of the robot, however, what may mark 
its norm fulfillment is precisely an inaccessible set of abilities or 
means for human beings. As seen in the case of subway crisis, 
for example, the role of the robot may not only be to perform 
the maneuver that human beings cannot but also to avoid being 
copied in doing so. No doubt science fiction has a long history of 
trading on such scenarios, where robots are alternately sublime 
models or alien monsters – the motivations for their use of pro-
digious abilities seem as hard to project fully onto ourselves than 
the powers themselves. But in the practical settings that robots are 
beginnings to inhabit, a more grounded discussion seems crucial 
to facilitate. In what specific arenas, with what particular roles 
and tasks, will robots need to strongly distinguish their actions 
from those of human beings?
Some of the more subject-oriented questions of robot identity, 
which have usually garnered more attention in discussions of robot 
ethics, can enter into productive engagement with these questions 
of social context and interaction. What are robots as actors – do 
they have selves, interests, desires, souls? As agents communicat-
ing, deliberating, and conversing with human beings, do they 
deserve moral consideration in and of themselves? Bryson (2010) 
provocatively proposed robots being seen as slaves to safeguard the 
moral priority for human beings and their lives. This very gesture, 
however, shows why starting with the question of agent, rather than 
action, is difficult to map, much less make progress in resolving. 
The term “slave” is itself anthropomorphic and can elicit more sym-
pathy for robots instead of less (being denied humanity has been 
tragically common for human beings throughout history). Even 
more importantly, Bryson’s and other discussions ultimately sug-
gest evaluations via concrete actions in the world – what is it that 
the “soul” or “tool” is doing rather than undergoing (Bryson 2012)? 
It may well be that the form of the robot, and the choreography, as 
it were, of the act may elicit moral attributions – empirical work in 
HRI notes some of the bonds that can develop from battleground 
to household (Scheutz, 2011). In part with those applied contexts 
in mind, Versenyi (1974) rightly stresses that the continuum that 
stretches from automated systems and machines like autopilots to 
robots is certainly one for pragmatic, as opposed to metaphysical, 
analysis. Making such actions explicit in context, and attempting to 
represent the reasoning that would help achieve them in the most 
reliable and acceptable fashion, can gain better traction for design 
and policy along that continuum.
ConCLUsion and FUtUre researCH
Several computational architectures have been provisionally 
proposed as ways to produce “ethical” or “moral” decision-
making, relying in different ways on deontic logic and utilitarian-
consequentialist perspectives. There have also been gestures 
toward cultivating “virtue” in robots, drawing on less formal, and 
more cumulative, training instead of charting a computationally 
predictable output. Certainly, extended forms of machine learn-
ing may be needed to “acculturate” a system and generate morally 
reliable judgment. But given the many social contexts where 
robots are being introduced, tested, and evaluated for their work, 
a computationally explicit, trackable means of decision-making 
is essential to explore and develop. This paper has proposed a 
representation of norms as a provisional theoretical guide for how 
successful action could be produced within limitations of infor-
mation, in ways that integrate considerations of risks and benefits 
with the moral expectations on which collaborative, constructive 
social action can depend.
This exploration of norms as facilitating the best actions, espe-
cially in circumstances of pressing need and limited information, 
suggests several related directions of psychological and social 
research. In terms of ethical theory, one must consider the social 
and cultural ramifications of different kinds of moral reasoning. 
Do norms reflect an agreed-upon sense that global utility, pursued 
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in all contexts, is ultimately not fully moral? Are there actions and 
contexts where an agent is expected to suspend that reasoning? 
The different modes of cultural valuation, including ritual, reli-
gious doctrine, art, and other symbolic expression, may provide 
constructive contrast to computational renderings of norms, both 
as proto-computational phenomena and as layered deposits of 
moral response and reaction. We have not concentrated here on 
the human responses to morally framed robot reactions, whether 
verbal or otherwise, because of our interest in action as opposed 
to agency attribution. One parting, long-term topic for HRI to 
pursue is how robotic performance will, in fact, begin alter the 
moral evaluation of human and robotic actions alike.
At the beginning of the paper, we noted the need to focus on 
robotic action – not agent status – and do so through a lens of 
success rather than just failure, which led us to explore a comple-
mentary role for norms relative to utility calculation. As ongoing 
work on that role for computation and ethical theory proceeds, 
it can usefully circle back to the question of failure and why that 
preoccupies current discussions. When it comes to the scenarios 
usually imagined, it is worth considering how they represent the 
threat of norm violations, whether because of an overly utilitar-
ian process or a rigid and overly formal rule. By engaging directly 
with the content and function of norms as part of computational 
systems’ decision-making, we may do more than achieve actions 
that we find successful in various contexts. We may also better 
discern which moral expectations of robot actions – including 
warnings of failure and ambitions of success – represent society’s 
most cherished values. Robots have been looked upon as good 
candidates for “3D jobs,” dirty, demeaning, and dangerous (from 
the Japanese kitanai, kitsui, kiken)  –  suggestive of things that 
may be beneath humans (Connell, 1993). But, there may also be 
supererogatory expectations – for which one might add “daring” 
to the list (as what a human would be who attempted it, not 
what the system itself is) – that give society reason to reflect on 
what “4D” jobs robots might best tackle (Lin, 2015). By keeping 
concrete jobs in crucial contact with robotic design, the process 
of understanding norms for robots may help society identify 
which values and actions are the most important to uphold and 
enhance.
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